Naval colleges will debate this series of events until the end of time, but the question surely the readers must be asking is why Halsey would take his entire Task Force 38 and leave the vital San Bernardino Strait wide open. And how could Kinkaid and Nimitz give him leave to do so … especially Kinkaid, whose own heavy battleships were in the southern approaches to the beachhead finishing off Nishimura’s decimated column, thus leaving the invasion fleet vulnerable should the Japanese suddenly come chugging through the straight and get among his escort carriers and transports; something that was about to happen.
Part of the blame can be placed on the divided command structure. Communication between Seventh and Third Fleet, being under MacArthur’s and Nimitz’s commands respectively, were indirect. Thus much ascertaining of the others’ movements and intentions were gleaned from listening in to radio chatter. In the early afternoon, suspecting that Japanese carriers were in the area, Halsey had drawn up plans to carve out a task force built around his fast battleships and one carrier group to remain near San Bernardino Strait should he head away from Leyte in pursuit of any carriers that popped up to the north.
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