A ceasefire is not peace. It is not the formal end of hostilities. It is a pause.
General Dan Caine, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, made that unmistakably clear at a Pentagon press conference on April 8, his first since President Donald Trump announced a ceasefire with Iran the previous evening: “A ceasefire is a pause, and the joint force remains ready, if ordered or called upon, to resume combat operations with the same speed and precision as we’ve demonstrated over the last 38 days.”
Iran’s rulers should now understand that this president does not bluff. The United States and Israel remain, in Trump’s words during January’s anti-regime uprising, “locked and loaded and ready to go.”
Since that warning, the landscape has changed dramatically.
Domestically, more than 40,000 Iranians have died after the regime unleashed extraordinary violence against demonstrators. Militarily, Iran has been badly weakened by combined U.S.-Israeli operations: its navy crippled, air defenses penetrated, missile stockpiles and launchers significantly reduced, and key elements of its defense-industrial and economic-industrial base severely damaged. The supreme leader and 51 of his top commanders and advisors have been eliminated along with thousands of members of the IRGC, Basij, law enforcement, and intelligence apparatus.
Diplomatically, nearly six weeks of attacks on Arab capitals have shattered what little trust remained between Tehran and its Gulf neighbors, and Iran is increasingly isolated even from American allies who have their fair share of differences with President Trump. Psychologically, Iran’s leadership has learned that beneath Trump’s social media theatrics — offensive to many — lies a president willing to act.
As in many wars, both sides now claim victory. But Iran’s claim is far less persuasive. For now, the regime has achieved the minimum objective of survival. Yet survival under sustained military, economic, and political pressure is not strategic success. The possibility of an Iran freed from Islamic Republic rule remains very much alive.
As talks begin this weekend in Pakistan to solidify the ceasefire, Washington should negotiate from a position of maximum leverage, not compromise. None of the 10 points reportedly included in Tehran’s public proposal deserves serious consideration: lifting all sanctions, preserving Iranian control of the Strait of Hormuz, demanding war reparations, permitting continued uranium enrichment, and insisting on an indefinite halt to hostilities would amount to strategic surrender by the United States. Tehran’s original 10-point proposal was fundamentally unserious, unacceptable, and, as the White House put it, “completely discarded.”
That should remain the administration’s posture. The central reality has not changed during these volatile weeks: The Islamic Republic remains the most dangerous force destabilizing the Middle East and a direct threat to American security. Replacing it with a government that allows Iranians to reclaim their country should remain the central objective of U.S. policy.
That requires abandoning illusions about trade-offs. Unlike the Obama administration’s pursuit of the 2015 nuclear deal, the Trump administration should not seek to persuade, incentivize, or rehabilitate Iran’s rulers. It should present terms and insist on compliance.
That means no enrichment. It means surrendering Iran’s enriched uranium stockpile. It means intrusive, unannounced inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency as a prelude to dismantling Iran’s nuclear infrastructure and ballistic missile program. It means freedom of navigation through the Strait of Hormuz. It means maintaining all sanctions until Tehran proves over time that it has ended support for regional terror proxies and complied fully with American demands.
And if protest conditions re-emerge inside Iran, Washington should stand openly with those protesters regardless of diplomatic timing. Claims that Iran’s protest movement is dead ignore a quarter-century of repeated uprisings. Again and again, the regime has crushed dissent; again and again, outside observers have declared the opposition finished; again and again, they have been wrong.
Since the 12-Day War of June 2025, when U.S. and Israeli aircraft struck Iran’s nuclear and military infrastructure, Tehran has learned what maximum pressure actually means. There is no reason to ease it now — and every reason to intensify it.
If Iran refuses — as it almost certainly will — then the alternative to accepting American defeat is exactly what Gen. Caine described: resume combat operations.
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Mark Dubowitz is chief executive of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies and the presenter of “The Iran Breakdown” podcast. Ben Cohen is a research fellow at FDD.
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