Since leaving the Amal party in 1982, Hezbollah — meaning “Party of God” — has established a name for itself like no other. A Shiite Islamist terrorist group committed to Israel’s destruction, Hezbollah has arguably become Lebanon’s most powerful political party, obtaining veto power and a position in the current leading coalition, which controls the majority. Now the highest-grossing terrorist group, receiving $700 million from Iran out of its likely $1.1 billion in total income, Hezbollah has achieved notoriety, executing high-profile attacks: The U.S. Marine Barracks and embassy bombings. Hezbollah has since furthered large-scale regional discord, provoking wars with Israel, supplementing Bashar al-Assad in the Syrian Civil War, and now, threatening Israel with 140,000 rockets and impending war.
Despite its antagonism, Hezbollah has also established a reputation for its deceitful “benevolence,” creating an elaborate welfare system that many Lebanese cannot resist and the under-resourced Lebanese government cannot match. This welfare system — entailing infrastructural, medical, and educational services — has fueled a dependency cycle through which many, especially disenfranchised Shiites, turn a blind eye to terrorism and reciprocate support for Hezbollah in return for social services. To defeat Hezbollah, policymakers must overcome Hezbollah’s “bene-violent” duality and offer economic considerations to displace Lebanon’s dependency on Hezbollah’s welfare apparatus.
Since its inception, Hezbollah has sought to forge support in local communities by offering free or heavily subsidize social services through its own NGOs. The most famous of these NGOs are Al Imdad and Al Shaheed, which rehabilitate the poor through welfare and training programs, Al Haya’a Al Sahhiyyah, which sponsors health and dental care at little to no cost, Jihad Al Bina’a (JB), which restores damaged homes and public utilities, Jam’eyat Ta’aleem Al Dini Al Islami, which educates and subsidizes education for Lebanon’s youth, and the Al Qard Al Hassan Association, which provides loans.
While these services are extensive, they are also essential necessities available at little to no cost. Cue Hezbollah’s medical infrastructure, which offers the low-income Lebanese free health insurance, free prescriptions, and health care at little to no cost. These services are also widely available and of quality, being furnished at six hospitals as well as at “hundreds of medical centers, infirmaries, dental offices, and mental health providers” throughout Lebanon. These medical centers are so advanced that, according to Hala Jaber’s Hezbollah: Born With a Vengeance, they can provide x-rays and specialized health services such as geriatrics and women’s health care. So while Hezbollah’s medical services are of quality, they are also ubiquitous and mobilizable, allowing Hezbollah to extend its reach to areas otherwise difficult for Lebanon’s government to access.
Hezbollah has also advanced much of the country’s public utilities infrastructure. It has done so primarily through its public-works wing, the JB, which has significantly impacted Lebanese lives. The JB has constructed over 400 reservoirs, thereby connecting 45% of Beirut’s southern suburbs and much of southern Lebanon to clean drinking water — a factor all the more important since Lebanon’s south depends heavily on irrigation farming. The JB has also connected much of Lebanon’s south to the electric grid, installing over 20 generators. Furthermore, it has previously launched large-scale garbage collection efforts, collecting on behalf of “a population of 500,000” at the end of the Lebanese Civil War.
Most important, perhaps, has been JB’s role in compensating housing, money, and basic necessities for those impacted by conflict. After provoking war with Israel in 1996, Hezbollah rebuilt 10,528 buildings while also compensating 2,300 farmers for their losses. Similarly, after provoking war in 2006, Hezbollah provided water, food, and shelter to those affected locally, while also footing $12,000 stipends to pay for the rents of homeowners while their homes were being rebuilt. Through connecting many to public utilities and housing during emergency, Hezbollah forges dependency on its welfare programs, thereby attracting party loyalty. Perversely, this cycle also allows Hezbollah to garner support by promoting the conflict and disrepair that Hezbollah can later “remedy” through its own welfare programs.
Further, Hezbollah has fueled support through subsidizing its private schools. Educating around 14,000 students, Hezbollah’s primary and secondary schools offer poorer students the opportunity to attend private school — a privilege since Lebanon’s public schools are often considered inferior. Hezbollah’s educational facilities often boast swimming pools and computer labs, encouraging students to attend class where they are later indoctrinated. Hence, through subsidizing education for thousands of students, Hezbollah cultivates a platform for grooming thousands to its cause.
Hezbollah also fosters support through its affordability and lending programs. In 2004, Hezbollah introduced its Al Amir discount card, which is purchasable for just one dollar and allows families to receive discounts of up to 50% at local shops. In 2014, 75,000 people owned a card. Hence, while promoting local business, Hezbollah also reaches out to tens of thousands who quickly discover Hezbollah’s benefits. Likewise, through its Al Qard Al Hassan Association, Hezbollah has processed over 700,000 loans totaling $245+ million — with many of the loans offering preferential conditions for a minor subscription fee. To no surprise, Hezbollah attracted 150,000 to its lending program in 2012 alone, thereby forging relationships and prospective supporters through even more welfare programs.
Ultimately, through its welfare apparatus, Hezbollah has reached out to hundreds of thousands of Lebanese — thus fostering allegiance, dependence, and propaganda victories. To defeat Hezbollah, powers must undermine Hezbollah’s welfare and propaganda outreach efforts — whether by devastating Hezbollah and Iran economically so that they can no longer sustain these programs, by sponsoring alternative paths to welfare and economic development to displace Lebanon’s allegiance to Hezbollah, or by combining these alternatives with military intervention. However, military action alone, while weakening Hezbollah’s military might, may perpetuate the devastation that Hezbollah has successfully exploited to remedy and to rally support.
Jordan Cope is currently a law student at the University of Texas at Austin, where he also completed his undergraduate degree. Having graduated with a B.A. in international relations, Jordan also minored in Middle Eastern studies and can speak Arabic and Hebrew. He has also published research on the security implications of Palestinian foreign aid. He can be followed @JordanCope12.
RELATED: Defund Lebanon. And Do It Yesterday.