The Iran Deal’s Biggest Secret

President Trump says we have a deal with Iran, an amazing deal for us and our allies.

The Iranians say they have a deal with the United States, the worst possible deal for them and their allies.

You know who doesn’t have the deal? Any of us.

We do not have words. We do not have the text.

I’m not about to take anybody’s word for it when there’s clearly no solid information for any of us to look at.

As I’ve been saying for months, war is a simple calculus. It is about which side can take more pain. That’s it. If I can take more pain than you, I win. Even if you win on an absolute level, you inflict more pain on me on an absolute level than I inflict on you, that doesn’t matter. You don’t actually win until the other side has experienced pain beyond what they are willing to bear.

If the other side is willing to undergo the pain of having all of their limbs lopped off, and you’re only willing to undergo the pain of a hangnail, the other side must only inflict minor pain; in order to win, you must inflict massive pain.

This was always the imbalance between the United States and Iran in this whole deal. The United States had to lop off all the arms, all the legs, eviscerate the leadership, make it so that Iran could not rise again in order to achieve what we want in a deal. Iran, in order to exert pressure on us, basically had to fire some drones and missiles at shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and at some oil fields.

What would a good long-term deal look like? Let’s point out that nothing that’s going on right now is a long-term deal. What we have right now is called a “memorandum of understanding.” Supposedly, it is a 60-day memorandum of understanding, which is kicking the can down the road because none of the major issues have been solved in this memorandum of understanding.

Let’s talk about what a great deal would look like for the United States, according to the administration’s list: No nuclear weapons or development or facilities, no ballistic missile development, no funding of terror apparatus abroad, and opening the Strait of Hormuz permanently without tolls.

Then, when all of those have been verified, we could talk about opening up the economy. That’s what a good deal would look like for the United States.

What would a bad deal — meaning a good deal for Iran — look like?

First, continuation of nuclear development, even if it’s pushed off, even if it’s slower; maintenance of nuclear facilities, capacity to keep nuclear material in the country.

Second, ballistic missile development revitalized; no sanctions on ballistic missile development, and money flowing into the country that could be used for additional ballistic missile development, which would create that umbrella of defense and offense that would prevent action to get rid of their nukes.

Third, continued funding of terrorism abroad, the rebuilding of the terror apparatus that Iran had prior to October 7, Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, Hezbollah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, and terrorist groups in Iraq. If they got more money coming in and they could continue to fund terrorism, that would be a win for them.

Fourth, continued Iranian control over the Strait of Hormuz, basically being told by Iran or given the tacit threat that any time things went wrong, Iran could shut down the world economy again and again.

Fifth, the biggest one, much more funding is going into Iran. Remember, before this war, Iran was basically on its last economic legs. The Iranian rial had spiked from 42,000 per American dollar to 1 million per American dollar. That was before the war. Their economy was falling apart. That’s why you had these gigantic riots in the streets, which ended with the Iranians shooting some 42,000 people in a weekend. So if more money goes into Iran, that is a win for Iran.

That’s the long-term standard.

I’m setting the standards up front so we know what we’re talking about. That’s because one of the things that I don’t like when we talk about good deal/bad deal is being vague about what we are saying.

To reiterate the five conditions for a good deal for the United States: No nukes, no ballistic missile development, no funding of terrorism abroad, opening the Strait permanently without tolling, and then theoretically opening up the economy.

What would the best deal for the Iranians look like?

First, continued nuclear development, even covert nuclear development, which would mean maintaining their nuclear facilities in-country, with all supposed watering down of nuclear material to be done in Iran, then continuing to cheat and hide. Second: Ballistic missile development. Third: Funding of terrorism abroad. Fourth: Continued control over the Strait. Fifth: More funding going into Iran.

What we have here, according to the Trump administration and Iran, is a memorandum of understanding, a temporary agreement.

What would a good temporary agreement look like for the United States? There are three options: Good, mediocre, and bad.

A good temporary agreement would look like anything that facilitated a good permanent agreement; whatever got us toward the goal of no nukes, no ballistics, no funding of terrorism, and opening the Strait permanently.

A mediocre temporary deal would ensure that Iran doesn’t get any of the things that it wants long-term, but it wouldn’t achieve all the good stuff, so it wouldn’t disarm them of nuclear weapons or ballistic missiles, but it would not release a bunch of money to them and might temporarily open up the Strait a little bit. It might release a small amount of money to them, and then we would go home, but we would leave the sanctions in place, which is the most important thing. Not opening the Iranian economy, not allowing them to tie their activity to terrorist groups in the region, and not allowing them to rebuild their ballistic missile facilities with our money.

A mediocre deal would basically be us packing up our stuff and going home. Why would that be mediocre and not great? Because we’ve done an enormous amount of damage to Iran’s facilities. We’ve already set them back tremendously. If we go home right now, then Iran will maintain some vestigial control over the Strait, will not permanently get rid of the Iranian nuclear program, and will not eliminate their ballistic missile capacity. It won’t prevent their funding of terrorism.

What would a bad temporary agreement look like? It would not only leave their nuclear development intact but also incentivize it. It would allow them to allocate more money to ballistic missiles. It would allow them to extend their terrorist reach, and it would allow full-scale, continued Iranian control over the Strait.

Which is it?

We don’t know. We literally do not know because the administration has not and will not release the text right now, which they should.

I’m happy to analyze a deal once I know what’s in it. I cannot analyze a deal for or against until I know what the hell is in the deal.

You don’t know what a good deal looks like just because one side says good and the other says bad. Right now, we have two sides telling two very, very different stories. You have President Trump saying he got a good, temporary agreement, and J.D. Vance saying that it’s a brilliant temporary agreement. You have Iran saying that it’s a very, very bad temporary agreement.

My hunch is that the temporary agreement doesn’t do much at all. Basically, the temporary agreement might be the mediocre scenario: We leave, they get a little bit of cash to open up the Strait of Hormuz, not enough to really revitalize their economy; the sanctions remain on them; we never get to any further negotiation on a nuclear weapons deal; we never get to any further negotiation on ballistics or terrorism, and they don’t get fully reintegrated into the world economy.

If that’s the end of the war, this goes with a whimper, not a bang. We would be saying, “You know what? We did enough. We’re out.”

We don’t know because we don’t have the text of the deal.