The chief of Israel’s Mossad told senior Israeli government officials that he is “100 % certain” that Iran is committed to developing a nuclear bomb, no matter the rhetoric coming from the Iranian government that masks that fact.
In a recent closed meeting, Mossad chief Yossi Cohen, said the nuclear deal was a “terrible mistake,” adding that the Iran nuclear deal permitted Iran to maintain certain key facets of its nuclear program. Cohen slammed the Obama Administration’s decision to lift sanctions on Iran, arguing that it significantly increased aggression by Iran.
Cohen continued, “As head of the Mossad, I am 100 percent certain that Iran has never abandoned its military nuclear vision for a single instant. This deal enables Iran to achieve that vision. That is why I believe the deal must be completely changed or scrapped. The failure to do so would be a grave threat to Israel’s security.”
President Trump has set a mid-May deadline for his decision as to whether to withdraw from the nuclear deal.
As incoming national security advisor John Bolton wrote last October:
Some say that trashing the deal will spur Iran to accelerate its nuclear-weapons program to rush across the finish line. Of course, before the JCPOA, Iran was already party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which barred it from seeking or possessing nuclear weapons, but which it systematically violated. JCPOA advocates are therefore arguing that although one piece of paper (a multilateral treaty, no less) failed to stop Iran’s nuclear quest, the JCPOA, a second piece of paper, will do the trick, with catastrophic consequences if we withdraw. Ironically, these same acolytes almost invariably concede the JCPOA is badly flawed and needs substantial amendment. So they actually believe a third piece of paper is required to halt Iran. Two are not enough. This argument flunks the smile test: Burying Iran in paper will not stop its nuclear program.
Iran’s ability to “rush” to have nuclear weapons existed before the deal, exists now, and would exist if America withdrew. The director of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran said recently it would take a mere five days for Iran to resume its pre-deal level of uranium enrichment …
Nor will U.S. withdrawal eliminate valuable international verification procedures under the JCPOA. In fact, these measures are worse than useless for nonproliferation purposes, although they serve Iran well. By affording the appearance of effective verification, they camouflage Iran’s active, multiple violations of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231: on uranium-enrichment levels, advanced-centrifuge research, heavy-water production and missile programs. The International Atomic Energy Agency recently admitted explicitly it has no visibility whatever into weapons and ballistic-missile work underway on Iran’s military bases.